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TUE LAW PROFESSOR AS POPULIST
Mark A Graber*

A new populism is taking root in the strangest soil, American law
schools. Tocqueville regarded "the profession of law" as an "aristocratic element," "a sort of privileged body in the scale of intellect."1
Lawyers, he observed, belonged to "the highest political class," and
routinely developed "some of the tastes and habits of aristocracy."2
During the 1990s, however, bold challenges to elite rule in the name
of popular majoritarianism were issued by distinguished professors
and chairholders at the most prestigious law schools in the United
States. Such leading jurists as Richard Parker, Jack Balkin, Akbil
Reed Amar, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet proudly declared
their populist identity, and urged fellow law professors to join the
people's crusade.' Deploring the "chronic fetishism of the Constitution, constitutional law, and the Supreme Court," these scholars are
presently calling for constitutional theory that acknowledges "that
'common' people, ordinary people-not their 'betters,' not somebody
else's conception of their supposed 'better selves' are the ones who
are entitled to govern our country."4 This "vision of 'populist
constitutionalism,'" Levinson notes, "seems to permeate the Yale

* Associate Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland at College
Park. My apologies to Martin Heisler and Howard Gilman for not taking more of their helpful
suggestions.
1. ALEXIS DE TocQuEvILE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 276, 273 (Henry Reeve et al.
trans., 1980).

2. Id. at 278, 273.
3. See AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSC, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION
REALLY SAYS ABOUTYOUR RIGHTS at xi (1998); RICHARD PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE":
A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO passim (1994); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS at x, 178-94 (1999); J.M. Balkin, Populism and

Progressivismas ConstitutionalCategories,104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1945-54, 1989-90 (1995).
4. PARKER, supra note 3, at 79, 97.
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Law School,"5 and is a presence on the legal faculties at Harvard,6
Michigan, 7 Texas,8 and Georgetown.9
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts expresses the
populist spirit from the very beginning. Professor Tushnet introduces his themes by reflecting on his experience "hear[ing] Joan
Osborne perform Patti Smith's song at a concert to benefit the
political group Voters for Choice on the anniversary of Roe v.
Wade." ° The words, which appear as the first text in the book, are
the following:
The people have the power
To redeem the work of fools
Upon the meek the graces shower
It's decreed
The people rule.1
The popular singer singing hymns to the people at a popular
gathering evokes a long populist tradition. Fifty years ago the folk
singer might have been Woody Guthrie singing the populist
standard, This Land is Your Land, at a union rally. Professor
Tushnet then recognizes an incongruity in populist tributes to Roe,
Mr. Justice Blackmun's opus. A"tension" exists, the first paragraph
of Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts concludes,
"between celebrating a Supreme Court decision finding abortion
laws unconstitutional and extolling popular political power." 2
Professor Tushnet's treatment of this tension should become a
classic in American political thought. Taking the ConstitutionAway
from the Courts advances two powerful theses that will occupy
American constitutional thinking for years to come. Opposing
clause-bound interpretivism, Professor Tushnet insists that
Americans are constitutionally obligated to respect a thin Constitu5. Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalPopulism:Is It Time for "We the People"toDemand
an Article Five Convention?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 211, 214 (1999).
6. See PARKER, supra note 3 (describing the view of a Harvard faculty member).
7. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critiqueof Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV.
434, 482 (1998) (describing a Michigan professor's viewpoint).
8. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 218 n.1 (describing the perspective of a Texas law
professor).
9. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at xii (describing the view of a Georgetown faculty
member).
10. Id. at ix. The Roe decision is reported at 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. TUSHNET, supranote 3, at ix. My antipopulist sensibility may best be revealed by the
fact that I had not heard of Joan Osborne, Patti Smith, or the song in question, until I read
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts.
12. Id.
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tion committed only to realizing the principles of the Declaration of
Independence, broadly understood. 3 In sharp contrast to the courtcenteredness of virtually all constitutional discourse in the legal
academy, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts insists that
the goals of a populist constitutional law can be achieved only if
federal (and presumably state) courts abandon their practice of
declaring laws unconstitutional.' 4 Most contemporary critics of

judicial power insist only that justices should not be the exclusive or
final interpreters of constitutional meaning," that justices should
have the power to declare only a limited class of laws unconstitutional, 6 that justices should declare unconstitutional only those
laws that no reasonable person would think constitutional, 7 or, as
Robert Bork has argued, that legislative majorities should have the
power to overrule judicial decisions declaring laws unconstitutional.'" Professor Tushnet goes the whole hog. He would eliminate
judicial review entirely. 9 Taking the ConstitutionAway from the

Courts maintains that judges should be authorized to interpret
13. See id. at 11-13, 31, 51, 185.
14. See id. at ix, 7, 107, 128, 174, 186, 194.
15. See, e.g., JOHNAGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURTAND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1955, 77-138 (1984); SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE
ABORTION AND WAR POWERS DEBATES 1-27 (1992); LOuIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATIONAS POLITICALPRoCESS 44-84,231-79(1988); SANFORD LEVINSON,
CONSTrTUTONAL FAITH 122-54 (1988).
16. See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PRoCESS: AFUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OFTHE ROLE OFTHE SUPREME COURT 60-70 (1980)
(explaining that courts should declare unconstitutional only laws inconsistent with the
individual rights provisions of the Constitution); ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V.
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 207-11, 223-33 (1989) (stating that courts should declare
unconstitutional only laws ofajudiciary nature); MATI'HEWJ. FRANCK,AGAINSTTHE IMPERIAL
JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE 65-91 (1996)
(explaining that some constitutional scholars support narrowing the range of issues in which
judicial finality should prevail).
17. See SYLVIASNOWISS, JUDICIALREVIEWANDTHELAwOFTHE CONSTITUTION 9-12,21222 (1990); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 323-56 (1986)
18. See ROBERT H. BORic, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 116-17 (1996). Several scholars have asserted that Supreme Court
justices should serve fixed, rather than life, terms. See L-A. POwE, JR., "OLD PEOPLE AND
GOOD BEHAVIOR," CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). Such claims do not directly challenge either
judicial review or judicial supremacy, but are means of making the exercise of those powers
more consistent with public opinion. Interestingly, no populist law professor has proposed a
preferred populist procedure, the election of federal justices.
19. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at ix, 7, 107, 128, 174, 186, 194. Some progressives and
populists at the turn of the twentieth century similarly called for the abolition of judicial
review. For those and other proposals to limit judicial review made during that era, see
WILLIAM G. Ross, AMIUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT
THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 313-24 (1994).
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statutes consistently with their best understanding of the thin
Constitution." Nevertheless, when legislatures express a clear wish
to ban flag burning, adopt affirmative action programs, allow prayer
in school, restrict campaign finance, or adopt any other constitutionally controversial measure, populist constitutional law requires
justices to respect the right of the people to interpret the thin
Constitution as they think best.
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts consistently raises
the sort of issues that American constitutionalists should consider,
but rarely do. Professor Tushnet is particularly successful in
demonstrating how arguments for (and against) judicial review
routinely rely on complex empirical and historical matters on which
legal academics have little expertise.2 ' This is a particularly
welcomed assertion for those as concerned with the present lawschool monopoly on constitutional theory as the present judicial
monopoly on constitutional exposition.22 As more scholars understand that constitutional theory is an interdisciplinary project, the
likelihood increases that more egalitarian exchanges will be
promoted between academic lawyers, philosophical philosophers,
and more empirically oriented students of political institutions and
behavior. Every serious constitutional theorist must confront the
arguments that Professor Tushnet lays out, especially if they wish,
as I do, to defend judicial review.
This potential classic of American political thought is not,
however, a classic of American populist thought. Some tensions,
inherent in the elite law professor as a populist, are visible on the
book jacket and title page, before the text even begins. In sharp
contrast to Robert Bork, who has been publishing polemics against
judicial review in trade presses, Professor Tushnet chose to submit
a serious, scholarly critique of that practice to a distinguished
university press.23 Princeton University Press is hardly the publisher of choice for populist broadsides. Works on that list are
written by and for elite professors or persons who aspire to be elite
professors. Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts, like most

20. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 164-65.
21. See, e.g., id. at 99, 123, 128.
22. See Mark A. Graber, Delegalizing ConstitutionalLaw, 6 GOOD SOCIETY: A PEGS J. 47
(Fall 1996).
23. One can tell some books by their cover. The blurbs on the back cover of Bork's books
are mostly from popular political commentators or leading newspapers. The blurbs for Taking
the ConstitutionAway from the Courts are from two academics.
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distinguished university press books, is far more likely to facilitate
interesting and important conversations
in faculty seminars than
2
make the author a media celebrity. 4
The first paragraph of Taking the ConstitutionAway from the
Courts reveals other tensions inherent in the elite law professor as
populist. The rally Professor Tushnet attended was for legal
abortion. This policy is strongly supported by America's elite. The
ordinary, working class Americans that populism celebrates are
more ambivalent about, if not generally opposed to, abortion on
demand.2 ' The rally is a benefit, rather than a demonstration,
march, or gathering. Professor Tushnet and other attendees are
exercising political power in the manner of the political elite, by
making monetary donations to a cause they favor.26 Populist
movements historically ask participants to contribute time and
energy, not a check. Tushnet never acknowledges the tension
between making a cash contribution promoting elite social values
while simultaneously declaring a populist sensibility better
embodied in the membership, rhetoric, and political style of those
political associations committed to more conservative social values.
Much of the tension in Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courtsbetween simultaneously celebratingRoe and popular political
24.

Professor Tushnet most clearly demonstrates his elite academic commitments when

declaring that his book is "not an argument that the populist interpretation is the
only, or even the best, interpretation of the Constitution," but that the work is designed only
to "open[ ] up issues that thoughtful voters and elected officials should think about."
TUSHNET, supra note 3, at xi. One imagines William Jennings Bryan concluding his speech
to the 1896 Democratic Party National Convention, see The Cross of Gold, Speech before the
DemocraticConvention (July 9, 1896), in SELECTED AIERICAN SPEECHES ON BASIC ISSUES

(1890-1950), at 182, 185-87 (Carl G. Brandt & Edward M. Shafter, Jr. eds. 1960), with the
following similarly stirring words:
The last paragraph's conclusion, "you shall not crucify mankind on a cross of
gold," is not an argument that the gold standard is an unjust, or even inferior,
monetary policy. By that catchy phrase I mean only to open up issues that
thoughtful voters and elected officials should think about.
Having had some fun at Professor Tushnet's expense, I should emphasize that the
above sentence is the keyto the book. Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts does not
work when read as providing definitive answers to important constitutional questions. The
book works fabulously, however, when read as detailing the sort of questions scholars must
raise when thinking about constitutional matters. Many disciplines would be better off
fostering intelligent speculation about important matters than definitive answers to lesssalient concerns.
25.

See MARKA. GRABER, RETHINKINGABORTION:EQuALCHOICE, THECONSTITUTION, AND

REPRODUCTiVE POLTICS 144-45, 205 n.103 (1996) (citing numerous public opinion polls).
26. Many contributions made at that benefit, no doubt, were beyond the means ofmost
ordinary, working-class Americans.
27. For the populist credentials of the pro-life movement, see MICHAEL KAZIN, THE
POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AiERICAN HISTORY 255-60 (1995).
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action is dissolved by analysis suggesting that abandoning judicial
review will not adversely affect most causes favored by those elites
who attend pro-choice benefits.2 8
This essay explores some of the problems that arise when elite law
professors pose as populists. One problem, articulately raised by
Professor Jack Balkin, is that "the academic who advocates
populism is still a member of an intellectual elite" who "writes in
academicjournals and speaks in the language of academic theory."2 9
The other problem is that elite law professors tend to be "scavengers,"" who "'ransack' the past to find arguments for whatever
vision of the social order they wish[ ] to promote."3 ' Liberal proponents of the republican revival in constitutional theory emphasized
classical republicanism's commitment to political participation,
ignoring the classical republican claim that such participation could
take place only in a homogenous society.32 A similar risk of appropriation exists when liberal law professors wander from republican to
populist paths when "roaming through history looking for [their]
friends."33 Elite jurists may extract material from populism that
suits their purposes, paying no attention to those elements of more
concern to working-class or religious populists.
The elite populism in Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts is weaker and thinner than the populism advanced by
working-class political movements. The populism is weak because
populist participation matters only when different institutional
forms are likely to yield similar results. Professor Tushnet favors
populist processes for making constitutional decisions only because
he concludes that less-populist processes are no more likely than
more-populist processes to yield the mix of policies that liberal elites
favor.34 The populism is thin because (1) political participation is the
only populist value considered; (2) Professor Tushnet does not
clearly advance a populist understanding of political participation;
and (3) abandoning judicial review is the only populist measure

28. See infra notes 36-44, 54-55 and accompanying text.
29. Balkin, supra note 3, at 1951.
30. Kathyrn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1591 (1988).
31. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 175 (1996).
32.

See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,

ORIGINAL INTENT & JUDICIAL REVIEW 25-27 (1999).
33. MORTON HORWITz, Republican Origins of Constitutionalism,in TOWARD A USABLE
PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 148 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen Gottlieb eds.,
1991).
34. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 154.
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advocated. Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts rarely
takes notice of other elite influences on the legal system and in the
broader political system. This latter omission threatens to undermine the entire project. If elites exercise similar influence in
nonjudicial fora, then taking the Constitution away from courts will
at most empower one set of elites at the expense of another set of
elites.
These comments refer more to the packaging than the substance
of Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. My political
sympathies lie with grass-roots progressivism rather than workingclass populism." Thus, my claim that Tushnet's political commitments seem closer to the latter primarily provides a more accurate
historical pedigree for views I think sound. The sections below that
question the merits of abandoning judicial review primarily point to
areas where additional research and philosophical clarifications are
necessary for a populist (or grass-roots progressive) constitutional
law. Nothing in the following pages provides the knock-down
refutation of any claim in Taking the ConstitutionAway from the
Courts. Professor Tushnet is extraordinarily successful raising
questions about received wisdom on the necessity for judicial review
in the United States. More generally, the self-identified populists
who teach at elite law schools have been producing a fascinating,
impressive, and important body of scholarship for the past decade.
The following pages contend only that Professor Tushnet and others
have not produced an impressive and important body of populist
scholarship. Many of their best arguments are not particularly
populist, while other arguments do not take a clear stand on issues
that distinguish populism from other participatory theories of
democracy. Taking the Constitution away from the courts is not
sufficient to achieve populist constitutional law, and such an
institutional reform may even limit popular participation in
constitutional debates unless other populist/grass-roots progressive
reforms are enacted.

35. See MARKA. GRABERTRANSFORMINGFREESPEECH:THEAMBIGUOUSLEGACYOFCIVIL
LIBERTARIANISM 227-34 (1991); Mark A. Graber, Conflicting Representations:Lani Guinier
and James Madisonon Electoral Systems, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 291 (1996).
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I. WEAK POPULISM
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts offers the weakest
possible populist attack on judicial review. Strong populist attacks
on judicial review judge political processes exclusively or at least
primarily by their capacity to improve the political participation and
influence of working-class Americans. If the abandonment ofjudicial
review were to increase popular participation in abortion policymaking and increase the probability that abortion would be
recriminalized, the strong populist believes judicial review must be
abandoned. Such a populist would insist either that the sole virtue
of political institutions is their capacity to increase political
participation or that the increased political participation associated
with abandoning judicial review is of far more value than keeping
abortion legal. No such argument appears in Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Professor Tushnet dissolves the tension
between his elite support for legal abortion and his populist
commitment to popular political power by claiming that legal
abortion and other liberal causes are as likely to be served by
legislative supremacy as by judicial supremacy.3 6 Populist values do
not trump other values. They are relevant only when judicial review
has no impact on the overall direction of public policy.
Professor Tushnet offers an impressive array of arguments for
taking the Constitution away from the courts: (1) vigorous debate on
constitutionalism already takes place outside of courts," and
judicial review may be responsible for many weaknesses in that
debate;3" (2) elected officials have numerous incentives to respect
constitutional limits; 9 (3) judicial policymaking may oscillate as
much as legislative policymaking; ° (4) courts are no more likely to
respect limits on judicial power than legislatures are to respect
limits on legislative power; 41 and (5) justices have historically
demonstrated no greater solicitude for human rights than other
governing officials.42 The gist of all these arguments is that proper
constitutional limits and values are as likely, if not more likely, to
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 186-87.
id. at 65.
id. at 57-66.
id. at 96-108
id. at 28.
id. at 26.
id.at 129-63.
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be honored when courts refuse to declare laws unconstitutional.
"[J]udicial review," Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts
concludes, "basically amounts to noise around zero: It offers
essentially random changes, sometimes good and sometimes bad, to
what the political system produces."" Because judicial review in
practice is "a marginal institution," Professor Tushnet acknowledges
that abandonment "would not increase our power of self-government
that much."" Still, he asserts, abolishing judicial review "may
contribute to serious thinking about the Constitution outside the
courts" and foster "[plopulist constitutional law," which "seeks to
distribute constitutional responsibility throughout the population."45
These arguments demolish traditional justifications for judicial
review. Conventional defenses of judicial review proclaim that
judicial review is legitimate when the Justices exercise the power
properly, as properly is defined by a particular theory of the judicial
function in constitutional cases.46 Some constitutional commentators
find judicial review in a democracy defensible when the Justices
strike down only those laws inconsistent with the original understanding of constitutional provisions.47 Others find it appropriate
when the Justices strike down only those laws inconsistent with a
particular understanding of democracy. 4 Still others think judicial

review is proper when the Justices strike down only those laws
inconsistent with a particular understanding of the Constitution's

43. Id. at 153. Professor Tushnet mayhave been more accurate when he previously noted
that because "[t]he Justices are members of the cultural elite," judicial outputs are likely to
reflect the opinions of that class. Id. at 150. Judicial decisions have also historically tended
to reflect the views of the presidential coalition that appointed the judicial majority than the
legislative coalition that confirmed the appointments of the judicial majority. See Mark A.
Graber, The NonmajoritarianDifficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,7 STUD. AM.
POL. DEv. 35, 65-66 (1993) (noting that judicial review"has consistently favored the interests
of the presidential wing of the dominant national coalition of the elite wings of both major
parties") [hereinafter Graber,TheNonmajoritarianDifficulty].Still, traditionaljustifications
ofjudicial review do not defend that practice as a means for augmenting presidential power
or increasing elite influence on public policy. I have hinted at such an elite justification of
judicial review. See MarkA. Graber, The ClintonificationofAmericanLaw:Abortion,Welfare,
and LiberalConstitutionalTheory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 807-13 (1997) [hereinafter Graber,
The ClintonificationofAmerican Law]; see also infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
44. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 174.
45. Id.
46. See infra notes 47-50.

47. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoR , THE TEMPTING OFAmERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAw (1990); WHIT=INGTON, supra note 32, at 218.
48. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDICIAL REvIEw
(1980).
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aspirations.4 9 Both as a matter of history and constitutional
structure, however, the Justices are unlikely to adopt any particular
theory of the judicial function for long periods of time when that
theory consistently produces results that are an anathema to the
dominant national coalition. The Justices do not simply follow the
election returns." Still, historical and empirical studies of judicial
review indicate that Justices rarely oppose strong majorities and
almost never do so for any length of time.5 1 Judicial review is least
likely to occur, Professor Tushnet properly concludes, when various
theories of the judicial function maintain that judicial review is most
needed. 2 Professor Tushnet is also right to think that nattering at
the Justices in law reviews, op-eds, or Princeton University Press
books is unlikely to change matters.5 3 "[W]e are entitled to be
skeptical," he writes, "when a hundred years of constitutional theory
has not yet persuaded judges to follow where principle-as defined
by the theory class-leads."5 4 Ifjudicial review is justifiable, then the
American practice of judicial review must be justifiable, not some
idealized system of judicial review. No extent theory of judicial
review has shown that courts have historically performed better
than legislators on constitutional matters and are likely to continue
better performance for the foreseeable future. More often than not,
constitutional theorists begin by cataloguing a 200-year reign of
error, alleviated only by one particular judicial regime or by a few
sage Justices who got the law right.5 5
This strong attack on traditional justifications for judicial review
is not, however, a powerful populist attack on judicial review. At no
point does Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts maintain
that the Constitution should be taken away from the courts even if
the likely long-term impact of legislative supremacy will be to
diminish protection of those constitutional limitations Professor
Tushnet believes government should respect. Every attack on

49. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1993); RONALD
DWORIKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
50. See RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT & CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 1953-1993
(1994).

51. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy:The Supreme Court as a
NationalPolicy-Maker,6 J.OFPUB. LAW 279 (1957); Graber, The NonmajoritarianDifficulty,
supra note 43, at 35.
52. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 162-63.
53. See id. at 155-57.
54. Id. at 157.

55. See BORK, supra note 47, at 19-132; Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrinciplesof
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-35 (1959).
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judicial review is based on the claim that liberal, typically elitist,
values are as likely to be served by legislative supremacy as by
judicial supremacy.5" Professor Tushnet indicates that abandoning
the practice of judicial review might result in some policies he
dislikes.5 7 Those policies are counterbalanced, not by more participation, but by the probability that legislative supremacy would also
result in other policies that Professor Tushnet and liberal law
professors favor.5" "[Wlithout judicial review," he observes, "liberals
would have to give up the prospect offurther constitutional gains for
gay rights and run the risk that they would be unable to defend
abortion rights in the political arena."5 9 "Conservatives," however,
"would have to give up the prospect of further erosion of affirmative
action programs and would have to fight campaign finance reform
in the political arena."" The last chapter recognizes that "[p] opulist
constitutional law offers no guarantees that we will end up with
progressive political results.""1 Instead of then making the populist
claim that more equal political processes are worth some sacrifice
of other progressive values, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the
Courts merely declares "neither does elitist constitutional law." 2
Should populist values clash with other values Professor Tushnet
cherishes, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts suggests
that the populist commitment to political participation might be
abandoned. 3 Professor Tushnet declares that "if democracy
regularly produced disagreeable results, I would rethink my
commitment to democracy."' He would support judicial review if he
was confident that the judicial majority would agree with him on all
issues.65 Professor Tushnet does not claim that he would sacrifice

56. See TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 154.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 186.
62. Id. The argument against judicial review in Taking the ConstitutionAway from the
Courts presently works with the substitution of any value that persons would consider good,
all things being equal. Let us assume that abandoning judicial review would make my
daughter, Rebecca, happy, and that all persons agree that making Rebecca happy is, all other
things being equal, a good thing. Let us further postulate, as Professor Tushnet does, that
judicial review is essentially"noise about zero" with respect to any other value that one would
think relevant to that practice. Id. at 153. It would then follow that judicial review should be
abandoned because that would make Rebecca happy. The role of populist participation seems
no stronger in the actual argument made in Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts.
63. See id. at 31.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 155.

384
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populist values to achieve even a slight increase in his preferred
policymaking. Still, the argument in Taking the ConstitutionAway
from the Courts does not clarify what force political participation
has when populist-process values conflict with substantive progressive values.
The attack on judicial review would have more populist bite if
serious disagreement existed over whether political participation
was desirable. Professor Tushnet and other legal populists maintain
that elites oppose political participation by ordinary people.6 6 Few
elitists, however, oppose the weak populist understanding of
political participation, that all things being equal, more political
participation is better than less. Elites, Professor Tushnet properly
notes, fear mass participation when they believe misguided or evil
policies will result from giving ordinary people too much power.6 7
Were they convinced that the people in the streets would demand
absolute monarchy, Louis XVII and Marie Antoinette might have
been populists.
II. THIN POPULISM
Professor Tushnet's attack on judicial review illustrates how elite
appropriation of populist identity risks denuded populism of vital
impulses. An argument that superficially calls on the people to take
the Constitution back from elites is, in fact, more structured to
persuade elites that little they value is at risk in institutional fights
for constitutional supremacy. By minimizing the stakes, Taking the
ConstitutionAway from the Courts tames populism, stripping that
persuasion of those elements that might inspire working-class
citizens. Ordinary people, who typically work longer and at more
physically demanding jobs than academics," are not likely to
mobilize against judicial review when little of substantive value is
at stake. While populists historically regarded judicial review as

66. See, e.g., PARKER, supranote 3, at 56, 60-61; TuSHNET, supranote 3, at 124.
67. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 124, 127. Professor Tushnet and other legal populists
are more confident than elite democratic theorists that ordinary people can be trusted to
protect fundamental values. Still, the argument in Taking the ConstitutionAway from the
Courts proves only that liberal elites should place as much trust in legislative processes as
in judicial processes, and not that liberal elites should place more trust in ordinary people.
Judicial review may amount to "noise about zero" because the elites who control legislative
decision-making are the same or similar to the elites who control judicial decision-making.
See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
68. See Balkin, supranote 3, at 1936.
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undemocratic, their primary reason for reducing judicial power was
to protect populist legislation.6 9
Similar appropriation is already taking place in the popular
culture that some populist law professors celebrate."° "Populism," in
the mass media, Michael Kazin observes, has become "something of
a fashion statement," used "to describe anything or anybody not
associated with the glamorous or the wealthy."7 1 He notes that the
populist label has been attached to "talk-show hosts, cable networks,
rock musicians, film directors, low-priced bookstores, even sports
fans who boo[ ] when rich athletes play poorly."7 2 Some upscale
corporations presently advertise their products as "[p]opulist." 3
Populism among law professors seems somewhere between a
serious political identity and a fashion statement. Some claims are
better understood as political slogans than as political commitments. The bare assertion that "[a] populist constitutional law rests
on a commitment to democracy"7' hardly distinguishes populism
from any other strand of American political thought. All participants in American public debates profess to agree on democracy.
Similarly, virtually all political movements in the United States
understand themselves as committed "to realizing the principles of
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's Preamble
[and to] ... the principle of universal human rights justifiable by
reason in the service of self-government."7 5 Legal populists better
express political commitments when they use "populism" to describe
policies and political programs that promise to increase political
participation. "The populist constitutionalist," Tushnet writes,
"believes that the public generally should participate in shaping
constitutional law more directly and openly."76 This understanding
of populism is compared to "elite" beliefs "that the people could not
possibly care enough about individual rights to protect them

69. See ROSS, supra note 19, at 10.
70. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 3.
71. KAZIN, supra note 27, at 271.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 31.
75. Id. at 181. Given Professor Tushnet's general philosophical orientation, I do not read
this claim as inconsistent with the anji-foundationalism of much American political thought.
76. Id. at 194; see also id. at x ("It is populist because it distributes responsibility for
constitutional law broadly."); id. at 106 ("[Ihe point of populist constitutional law... is to
enhance the public's consideration of fundamental issues."); id. at 174 ("Populist
constitutional law seeks to distribute constitutional responsibility throughout the
population.").
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through politics."" Such a populism, understood largely as a
synonym for participatory democracy, does have some bite. Still, the
contemporary legal version of populism is a pale version of historical
populism, and is probably better classified as an offshoot of grassroots progressivism.
A populism committed only to increasing political participation is
a remarkably thin populism. Populists did champion political
participation. Elite law professors who write as populists, however,
mute the antielitist, producerist, and religious strains of populist
thought. Moreover, the political participation championed in Taking
the ConstitutionAway from the Courts is not distinctively populist.
Professor Tushnet advocates more political participation, but does
not take a stand on the more-populist concern with the participatory
opportunities sufficient to afford all interested citizens an equal
share.in government." Finally, the only populist proposal Professor
Tushnet endorses is that judicial review should be abandoned.7 9
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts does not consider
other elite influences on the production of constitutional meaning,
influences that may suggest that populists should have priorities
other than abandoning judicial review, and that abandoning judicial
review at present may not serve populist interests.
A. Populist Values
The legal populist claim that "American populism.., is simply
about democracy"" seems false to the populist experience. The best
expressions of Populist Party sentiments, the Ocala Platform of
1890 and the Omaha Platform of 1892, are primarily devoted to
substantive policy demands. Of the seven demands made in the
Ocala Platform, only the seventh, calling "for the election of United
States Senators by direct vote of the people of each state," directly
concerns democratic processes.8 ' The Omaha Platform of the
Populist Party was devoted entirely to substantive policy concerns,
77. Id. at 124; see also id. at 177 (claiming that "Eliberals today seem to have a deeprooted fear of voting... because they are afraid of what the people will do").
78. See id. at 154, 194.
79. See id. at 154.
80. Richard D. Parker, Book Review, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 394, 394 (1997) (reviewing
MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (1995), and ROBERT H.
WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1995)).
81. Report of the Committee on Demands, inAPOPULIST READER: SELECTIONS FROMTHE
WORKS OF AMERICAN POPULIST LEADERS 88-89 (George Brown Tindall ed., 1976).
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although the "expression of sentiments" at the end, clearly designated "not as a part of the Platform of the People's Party," called for
a "secret ballot system," "the initiative and referendum," "the
election of Senators of the United States by a direct vote," and
82
"limiting the office of President and Vice-President to one term."
Late nineteenth-century populists and their progeny did insist that
various democratic failings explained why the federal government
refused to adopt their preferred policies. The National People's
Party Platform began by declaring: "[c]orruption dominates the
ballot-box, the Legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the
ermine of the bench."8 3 Nevertheless, American populists have not
historically been concerned with increasing democratic participation
solely or primarily because increased political participation has
intrinsic virtue. The value of political participation for its influence
on human development is far more associated with such progressives as John Dewey, Jane Addams, and Louis Brandeis than
populist leaders.' Populists were for a more participatory democracy because, unlike Professor Tushnet, they believed that participation by ordinary persons would considerably alter the course of
American policymaking. Populist attacks on judicial review were
intended to secure populist legislation, and not to alter the balance
of institutional power for pure process reasons.8 5
Three distinct strands of populist rhetoric that cannot be reduced
to political participation have endured over time: producerism,
religiosity, and antielitism. Most populists celebrate labor as the
creator of all value, condemning both the idle poor and the unproductive rich who live off the labor of others. Populist "producerism,"
Michael Kazin's history of that persuasion points out, was "an ethic"
holding "that only those who created wealth in tangible, material
ways (on and under the land, in workshops, on the sea) could be
trusted to guard the nation's piety and liberties."8 6 The populist
world-view has also been religious rather than secular. As Kazin
notes, "[the notion that a democratic politics must concern itself
with the enforcement of [Christian] ethical standards, both public

82. National People's Party Platform, in A POPULIST READER: SELECTIONS FROM THE
WORKS OF AMERICAN POPULIST LEADERS, supranote 81, at 90, 94-95.
83. Id. at 90.
84. For a discussion of participatory values in grass-roots progressive thought, see
GRABER, supranote 35, at 87-95.
85. See ROSS, supra note 19, at 10-11.
86. KAZIN, supranote 27, at 13; see also id. at 14, 17, 53-54, 162-63 (discussing the ethic
of populist procedurism).
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and private, was integral to the appeal of Populism."8 7 Finally,
populism has historically been strongly antielitist, on the ground
that elites lack the proper values of the common folk. Elites, in
populist discourse, were "everything that devout producers ... were
not: condescending, profligate, artificial, effete, manipulative, given
to intellectual instead of practical thinking, and dependent on the
labor of others."8 Twentieth-century populist movements have not
championed all these values, but most have advanced at least one.
Contemporary legal populists ignore all.
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts does not express
any populist antielitism. Professor Tushnet notes that "justices are
members of the cultural elite," 9 but does not claim that the values
of that elite are in any way inferior to those of ordinary people. On
many issues, most notably abortion, Professor Tushnet is quite
sympathetic to elite values.9" The closest he comes to elite-bashing
is when he declares that "[e]litists tend to think that the people
could not possibly care enough about individual rights to protect
them through politics."9 ' This claim, Professor Tushnet then
declares, "may... accurately reflect current circumstances."9 2
Other legal populists are similarly restrained in their criticism of
elites. "[Populist constitutionalism," according to Balkin, merely
"demands that academics become more self-conscious about their
status as members of a subculture whose elite values tend to shape
and occasionally distort their perspectives."9 3 Parker indicts elites
only for "biased exaggerations" of the prejudices of ordinary people.94
No legal populist asserts at any length that the values of ordinary
people are by and large superior to the values held by most law
professors. Nineteenth-century antielitist populism had a strong
machismo strain, exemplified by the conduct of President Andrew
Jackson.95 Contemporary legal populists would probably regard the

87. Id. at 6; see also id. at 2, 10, 17, 33, 54, 133 (discussing populist religious ideals).
88. Id. at 15; see also id. at 1-2, 10-11, 15-16, 32-33, 65, 106 (discussing populist views of
the elite).
89. TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 150.
90. See id. at 64-65, 124, 135, 136-37, 138-39, 147, 145-50, 186 (discussing abortion
issues).
91. Id. at 124.
92. Id. at 124, 127. Tushnet does seem less sympathetic with "country-club Republicans"
for favoring legal abortion while disfavoring federal funding for abortion. See id. at 149.
93. Balkin, supra note 3, at 1990.
94. PARKER, supra note 3, at 92-93.
95. See KAZIN, supra note 27, at 19-24.
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seventh President's attacks on the masculinity of his opponents as
a form of sexual harassment.
The religious dimension of populism is also missing from the
contemporary legal populist persuasion. Professor Tushnet devotes
an entire chapter to the law of religion outside of the courts, 96 but at
no point does he indicate that religious values are particularly
important. Religion in Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts
is neither vital to regime maintenance nor a source of valuable
inspiration. Professor Tushnet merely suggests that liberals ought
to tolerate religious arguments when good secular arguments exist
for the same policy.97 He does not call on liberals to make religious
arguments. The populist perspective is limited to determining
whether posting the Ten Commandments in classrooms serves a
sufficient secular purpose; 9 that secular purpose may not be that
religious values are necessary to maintain the polity. More generally, Professor Tushnet reduces religion in public life to questions of
political tactics. "[Lliberals," he writes, "often may have good
prudential reasons for putting up with religious arguments, and.
. . religious people often may have good prudential reasons for
refraining from making religious arguments in public." 99 The
arguments for these propositions strike me as interesting, important, and largely correct.0 0 Secular "[1]iberals[,] confident that they
will prevail in the long run[,] can afford to be generous."' This,
however, is hardly a populist battle cry.
No contemporary legal populist expresses the Jeffersonian
sentiment that "those who labour in the earth are the chosen people
of God." 0 2 In keeping with his egalitarian interpretation of the
Declaration of Independence, Professor Tushnet believes all
occupations are created equal. Nowhere does he suggest that
working-class persons are better able to govern than elites.0 3
Indeed, Professor Tushnet believes that "[j]udicial interpretations

96. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 72-94 (chapter entitled "The Constitutional Law of

Religion Outside the Courts").
97. See id.at 75-77.
98. See id. at 77.
99. Id. at 84.
100. I do think Professor Tushnet should explore at some length the problems presented
in small communities where one religious sect is dominant.
101. TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 86.
102. THOMAS JEFFERSON,THEPORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 217 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1975).
103. See TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 181-82.
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may have added weight because they come from experts."1 4 His
point is that "the normative weight comes from the expertise....
not from the office." 0 5 Progressives agree completely. Following good
progressive practice, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts
refers to the powers and rights of an undifferentiated people, rather
than the conflict between ordinary people and elites.0 6 Parker
insists that elites are, at heart, ordinary, a claim that both historical
populists and elites would find insulting.0 7
Professor Tushnet's refusal to appeal to any populist value other
than political participation has potential political ramifications. The
logic of Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts does not
require any appeal to producerist, religious, or antielitist values.
The political appeal may. Populist arguments are supposed to
appeal to ordinary, working-class citizens. Contemporary legal
populists who extract from populism the participatory values
cherished by some liberal elites, while ignoring populist sentiments
more inspiring to the masses, are likely to produce works that are
critically acclaimed in the law reviews and ignored in the popular
press.
B. PoliticalParticipation
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts advances a weaker
and thinner understanding of political participation than more
producerist-oriented populisms. The understanding is weak because
Professor Tushnet does not claim that increasing political participation is more important than other political goods. His argument is
merely that more participatory processes are, all other things being
0° The populist
equal, better than less participatory processes.'
commitment to political participation is thin because Professor
Tushnet does not explain why participation is valuable. The
understanding of political participation in Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts is neither yoked to a populist theory of

104. Id. at x.

105. Id.
106. See KAZIN, supranote 27, at 51 (noting that "[tihe progressives' favorite synonym for

'the people' was 'citizens' or 'the public' rather than 'producers").
107. See PARKER, supra note 3, at 109-10.
108. See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
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political equality nor a progressive theory of human development
and informed decision-making.
Strong populist Democrats believe that "every citizen has the
0 9 Political participation, in this
right to equal legislative influence.""
view, is not simply one democratic good among many. A polity is
democratic only to the extent that participatory opportunities enable
any interested citizen to have the same influence on policymaking
as any other interested citizen.1 Debate exists over what government institutions best reduce inequalities in actual power. Still, the
pure populist maintains that actual political equality is the virtue
of democratic political orders. Participation is valued primarily as
a means of securing equal political influence.
Populists have historically not understood political participation
as a vehicle for improving human capacity or enabling governing
officials to make more informed decisions. The leaders of workingclass movements generally regard preferences as prepolitical.
Ordinary Americans learn their sound political values when
working to produce material wealth and when attending church.
They do not discover their true interests when listening to elites,
although elites may articulate those interests more persuasively."'
Populism also has no historical sensitivity to the free-speech rights
of those who would challenge the basic values of ordinary Americans."1 2 Political participation, in a producerist world-view, is more
a means for protecting working-class interests developed in
nonpolitical settings than a means for developing better, more fully
human, interests.
Populist democracy stands in sharp contrast to more formal
understandings of democracy. Many democratic theorists maintain
that democracy (or polyarchy) exists whenever governing processes
109. LANi GuINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 124 (1994).

EAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNEss IN

110. See Balkin, supranote 3, at 1988 (noting that populists do not tend to believe persons
have communal obligations to take an interest in politics). Political quiescence, however,
cannotbe a consequence ofcoercion orlimited political agendas. See generallyJOHNGAvENTA,
POWERAND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLIONINANAPPALACHIANVALLEY (1980).

111. See KAZIN, supranote 27, at24-25 (stating"[t]hus, an enduringironyofpopulism: this
language that praises connections between anonymous people and mistrusts the palaver of
elites has often been communicated most effectively by eloquent men who stand above the
crowd").
112. The uncontroversial point is simply that populists have never assumed leadership
roles fighting for the free speech rights of nonpopulists. The extent to which populists
assumed leadership roles fighting againstfree speech rights is controversial. See MICHAEL
PAUL ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND McCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER 1-7 (1967).
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incorporate a relatively universal suffrage, relatively free speech,
and certain other procedures for making public policy.113 Joseph
Schumpeter advanced one influential version of this theoretical
approach when he declared, "the democratic method is that
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people's vote."" Those governing systems that
satisfy these minimum requirements are all democratic.
More formal democrats do not believe all democracies are created
equal. Some democratic forms are better than others because they
are better able to realize a plurality of human goods. Equal distribution of political power is usually considered one democratic good, but
not the only democratic good. Nonpopulist democrats are also
concerned with the form of government most likely to yield good
policy, best develop certain human capacities, and maintain national
strength. Very limited deviations from democratic form may even be
justified when necessary to achieve these ends.
The participatory strain in democratic theory shares the populist
concern with political participation, but participatory democrats are
far more likely than populists to emphasize the intrinsic virtues of
participation. Classical democrats, Jack Walker wrote, "were not
primarily concerned with the policies which might be produced in a
democracy; above all else they were concerned with human development."" 5 Lane Davis similarly understands participation "as a vital
means of intellectual, emotional, and moral education leading
toward the full development of the capacities of individual human
beings."" 6 Walker and Davis reject the elitist view that ordinary
people have no capacity to participate in politics."' They also,
however, reject the populist view that persons may fully develop all
their human capacities in private settings. "The road to intellectual
and moral growth," Davis declares, "must lead to participation in
the practical problems of public affairs.""' Grass-roots progressives
similarly claimed that "the final end of the state was to make men

113. See, e.g., ROBERTA. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 63-84 (1956).
114. JOSEPHA. SCHUMPETER, CAPIrALISM, SOCAuSMANDDEMOCRACY 269 (Harper & Row
1962) (1942).
115. Jack L. Walker, A Critiqueof the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. SCL REV.
285, 288 (1966); see also Lane Davis, The Cost of Realism: ContemporaryRestatements of
Democracy, 17 W. POL. Q. 37, 40 (1964).
116. Davis, supra note 115, at 40.
117. See Walker, supra note 115, at 291-95.
118. Davis, supra note 115, at 41.
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free to develop their faculties," and placed special emphasis on the
freedom of speech, both as a means for achieving that goal and
because free speech was "indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth."'1 9
This cursory exercise in democratic theory suggests that legal
populism must be more carefully formulated at present if elite law
professors truly wish to identify more with Tom Watson than John
Dewey. Claims that legal populists value participation do not
distinguish self-identified populists from the numerous democratic
theorists who think participation is one of many democratic goods.
More significantly, legal populists who stress general participatory
values do not distinguish themselves from many self-identified
progressives. John Dewey, Louis Brandeis, and Jane Addams were
among the many grass-roots progressives who placed political
participation at the center of their democratic theories. ° Dewey
regarded a democratic society as one that made "provision for
participation in its good of all of its members on equal terms."' 2 '
Addams regarded democracy as "an attempt at self-expression for
each man." 22 Their emphasis on participatory values sharply
distinguished them from the strand ofprogressivism associated with
Herbert Cooly and Walter Lippman.1 3 Dewey progressives differed
from populist democrats because progressives did not believe
political equality was the only democratic good, placed considerably
more emphasis on participation as a means for human development,
and celebrated free speech
for all citizens as a means for realizing
124
a more informed public.
The strong populist who thinks political equality the only
democratic good is probably as much a straw person as the pure
elite democratic who thinks that persons without an Ivy League
education should have the decency not to speak or vote on matters
of public importance. All professed democrats think greater and
more equal political participation to be a democratic good, but not
the democratic good. Differences among democratic theorists are
differences of degree. Populist democrats are more committed to
achieving political equality and are less willing to trade the
119. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See
generally GRABER, supranote 35, at 98-100.
120. See GRABER, supra note 35, at 87-95.
121. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACYAND EDUCATION 115 (1916).
122. JANE ADDAMS, THE SECOND TWENTYYEARS AT HULL-HOUSE 383 (1930).
123. See GRABER, supra note 35, at 78-83.
124. See id. at 95-100 (discussing grass-roots progressivism and free speech).
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participatory opportunities necessary to achieve that equality for
other possible democratic goods. Populists believe that ordinary
persons already possess adequate political capacities. Progressives
believe that participation in politics will improve human capacity
and foster more informed decision-making.
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts does not take a
clear stand on those issues that divide democratic theorists.
Professor Tushnet does take the nonpopulist view that other human
goods may sometimes trump the human goods associated with
political participation, and he seems to have a more progressive
than populist understanding of free speech. 2 ' He does not, however,
clarify what human goods are associated with participatory
democracy. His book speaks of "distribut[ing] responsibility for
constitutional law broadly" and "return[ing] constitutional law to
the people."' 2 6 Readers never learn why "disagreements over the
thin Constitution's meaning are best conducted by the people."'2 7 We
might want to distribute responsibility for constitutional law more
broadly to equalize political influence, foster informed decisionmaking, improve human capacity, or maximize all three of these
ends. Similarly, Professor Tushnet does not make clear whether his
claim that "the public should generally participate in shaping
constitutional law more directly and openly"'28 means that all
interested citizens should have an equal influence, or merely more
influence, on how constitutional questions are resolved.
These questions have important ramifications for the status of
judicial review in populist constitutional law. Many political
practices foster some participatory values while inhibiting others.
Giving all persons named Smith the power to veto minimum wage
laws may increase both political participation and political inequality. More Smiths participate in politics than Joneses who drop out,
but power is distributed more unequally among the Smiths and the
Joneses. Judicial review may have a similarly complex impact on
political participation. Should judicial review bring neglected issues
to public attention, that practice will "enhance the public's consideration of fundamental issues," but will not enable the public to

125.
129-33,
126.
127.
128.

See supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text; see also TUSHNET, supranote 3, at
162-63.
TUSHNET, supra note 3, at x, 186; see also id. at 174.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 194.
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"shap[e] constitutional law more directly and openly."'2 9 If this and
other suggestions made in the next section have any empirical
weight, opponents of judicial review need to more clearly specify
why they value political participation.
C. Realizing PopulistConstitutionalLaw
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts frequently maintains that populist constitutional law will be realized solely by
taking the Constitution away from the courts. Doing away with
judicial review, that work proclaims, "would return all constitutional decision-making to the people acting politically. It would
make populist constitutional law the only constitutional law there
is." "' This claim ismodified, however, both explicitly and implicitly
in the text. Professor Tushnet recognizes that certain procedural
and substantive failings in contemporary legislative and electoral
politics will not vanish the moment courts stop declaring laws
unconstitutional.'' Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts
is best read as suggesting that legislative supremacy is the most
populist process for making constitutional decisions,. and that no
other constitutional decision-making process is likely to yield more
populist/liberal decisions.
Populist constitutional law will not be achieved in the absence of
judicial review if persons are not able to vote, criticize government,
and develop individual opinions.3 2 "Judicial review confined to
securing these prerequisites to populist constitutional law,"
Professor Tushnet admits, "would surely be a good thing." 3' No good
historical or institutional reason exists, however, for thinking that
judicial review in practice can be so cabined. As Professor Tushnet
correctly writes, "[o]nce we tell justices that they ought to... secure
the preconditions of populist constitutional law,... they will be
doing much more [and less] than that."3 " For every judicial decision
enabling more people to vote, another judicial decision will prevent
the people from regulating campaign finance. This judicial inability

129.
130.
courts"
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 106, 194.
Id. at 154. Tushnet identifies "the project of taking the Constitution away from the
with "developing a populist constitutional law." Id. at 7.
See id. at 154.
See id. at 157-58.
Id. at 158.
Id.
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to police the political process explains why Professor Tushnet thinks
populists are better off permitting politically accountable elected
officials to have the final say on what the Constitution means at any
particular time. The processes by which contemporary elected
officials presently make constitutional decisions hardly satisfy
populist standards, but courts have historically demonstrated no
tendency to make less-populist processes more populist.
Taking the Constitution away from the courts will also not
guarantee the substance of populist constitutional law. Professor
Tushnet sometimes writes as if his concerns are purely procedural,
but other passages indicate that populist constitutional law has
particular commitments. "[Plopulist constitutional law seeks to
distribute constitutional responsibility through the population,"' 85
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courtsdeclares, but populist
constitutional law is also "law oriented to realizing the principles of
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's
Preamble." 136 Doing away with judicial review cannot guarantee
that the resulting constitutional law will meet this standard. All
governing institutions are capable of making decisions inconsistent
with any reasonable interpretation of the Declaration of Independence. Orville Faubus violated the thin Constitution when he defied
court orders desegregating the school system in Little Rock,
Arkansas.37 Professor Tushnet similarly claims that proposals to
constitutionalize birthright citizenship "reject the Declaration's
principles." 38 Still, Dred Scott v. Sandford,'3 9 Plessy v. Ferguson,40
Debs v. United States,' McCleskey v. Kemp,' and other judicial

135. Id. at 174.
136. Id. at 181.
137. See id. at 14. Professor Tushnet claims that "Governor Faubus could not plausibly
have claimed that his actions advanced the Declaration's project." Id. Chief Justice Taney,
however, argued at length that denying citizenship to former slaves was mandated by the
Declaration of Independence. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-12
(1856). At no point in Taking the ConstitutionAwayfrom the Courtsis Professor Tushnet able
to point to a policy that at the time the policy was politically controversial was nevertheless
understood by all parties to the debate as inconsistent with the Declaration of Independence.
See infra notes 138-43.
138. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 191. But see PETER H. SHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH,
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (defending

the constitutionality, though not the desirability, of proposals to limit citizenship to persons
born in the United States).
139. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
140. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
141. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
142. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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decisions' demonstrate that Justices are as prone as other officials
to reach decisions inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation
of the Declaration of Independence. If legislative supremacy is the
most populist process for making constitutional decisions, then
populists should prefer the risks of legislatures making constitutional mistakes to the approximately equal risk of justices making
constitutional mistakes.
Doing away with judicial review may not "return[ ] constitutional
law to the people, acting through politics,"' even when the above
qualifications are taken into account. Ajudiciary without the power
to declare laws unconstitutional, Professor Tushnet asserts, would
still exercise considerable influence on how the thin Constitution is
interpreted.'45 If judicial review is problematic from a populist
perspective, then lesser judicial powers may also be problematic.
Moreover, when constitutional meaning is produced outside of the
courts, elite influences on legislative and electoral processes inhibit
populist constitutional law. Given the expense of political campaigns
and the relative ease of access to the courts, judicial decisionmaking at present may actually increase popular participation and
influence on constitutional decision-making. At least these empirical
concerns warrant more investigation than they are given in Taking
the ConstitutionAway from the Courts.
Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courtsis remarkably blind
to disturbing political conditions that Professor Tushnet eloquently
describes elsewhere. Professor Tushnet is aware that contemporary
electoral and legislative processes have numerous democratic flaws,
most notably the influence of money in political campaigns. 14 6 His

claim that judicial review is as likely to exacerbate as mitigate those
flaws is reasonable. Nevertheless, until those flaws are corrected,
taking the Constitution away from the courts will not result in a
populist constitutional decision-making process. At most, abandoning judicial review will result in a more populist constitutional
decision-making process. If, however, the actual democratic flaws in
present legislative and electoral processes are as bad or worse than

143. Readers, particularly readers who do not share my constitutional proclivities, should
feel free to add or substitute their favorite judicial ogres at this point.
144. TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 186.
145. See id. at 163-64.
146. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New ConstitutionalOrder and the Chastening of
ConstitutionalAspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29 (1999) (describing numerous democratic
deficiencies in the contemporary policymaking process).
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the actual democratic flaws in the contemporary system for making
constitutional decisions, then taking the Constitution away from the
courts will result in a less-populist constitutional decision-making
process. The only way to determine the populist/democratic
consequences of abandoning judicial review is to examine, more
carefully than Professor Tushnet does, the populist vices and virtues
of the different processes by which constitutional decisions might be
made.
1. The Thin Constitution in the Courts
Professor Tushnet does not propose to take the Constitution away
from the courts entirely. Justices, he declares, should rely on the
thin Constitution when interpreting statutes. 147 "The greater the
tension between the statute and the thin Constitution's values," he
asserts, "the more reason a court would have for interpreting the
statute in a way that reduces the tension."14' A Tushnetian Justice
who believed that racial quotas or bans on abortion violated the
principles set out in the Declaration of Independence would not
interpret a statute as authorizing such policies unless the authorization was unequivocally stated on the statute's face.' 4 9 Taking the
ConstitutionAway from the Courts also suggests that Justices could
rely on the thin Constitution when scrutinizing the behavior of
police, prosecutors, and other unelected officials. 50 "Decisions by
elected legislators," Professor Tushnet comments, "have greater
democratic justification than decisions by even the most conscientious police officer [s]." '5When confronted with malenforced bans on
abortion or homosexuality, a Tushnetian Justice might insist that
the legislature take steps to ensure egalitarian enforcement, revise
the statute to be consistent with existing enforcement practices, or
53
2
leave the conduct in question unregulated.' 5 In other writings,
Professor Tushnet has expressed some sympathy with Judge Guido

147. See TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 163-64.
148. Id. at 164.
149. See id. at 165.
150. See id. at 164.
151. Id. at 47.
152. See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 25, at 76-117.
153. See Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative
Illuminationof the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 267 n.85 (1995).
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Calabresi's view that "constitutional courts may assist in purging
5
the statute books of laws that have lost majority support." "
This judicial freedom to construe the thin Constitution subject to
legislative revision vests courts with substantial power to influence
constitutional meaning. At the very least, judicial interpretations of
the thin Constitution will remain good constitutional law until the
legislature provides a more authoritative construction. The delay
may be considerable when Congress is occupied with other matters.
Justices will frustrate a law-making majority committed to capital
punishment when all members ofthat governing majority agree that
balancing the federal budget is more important than passing a bill
that more clearly mandates the death penalty for certain crimes.
More importantly, simple majorities do not govern in the United
States. Multiple majorities are necessary to change the status quo.
Ajudicial decision "interpreting" a federal statute as not mandating
capital punishment can be overruled only if the President, Senate
majority, and majority in the House of Representatives are for
capital punishment, or if a supermajority in both chambers of the
national legislature are for capital punishment.'55 The potential
populist problems with this judicial power to impose constitutional
limits on simple majorities may be exacerbated if,as Professor
Tushnet reasonably thinks, courts are more likely to protect
constitutional rights when judicial decisions are subject to legislative revision.'5 6 Justices, in Tushnetian constitutionalism, may not
hand down any decisions that can be overturned only by a supermajority. They will be encouraged, however, to hand down far more
decisions than at present that can be overturned only by a multiple
majority.
This nonmajoritarian judicial power to construe statutes consistently with the thin Constitution seems inconsistent with the
populist commitment to"return[ing] constitutional decision-making
to the people.""' A populist constitutional system might not give any
special status to laws enacted by past majorities or vague laws
enacted by present majorities. Still, if populism is committed to

154. Id. (citing GuIDo CALABRESI,ACOMMONLAWFORTHEAGE OF STATUTES 16-30 (1982)).
155. This analysis ignores such nonmajoritarian practices as the committee system and
filibuster rule on the ground that a simple legislative majority could abandon those rules by
so voting when the House of Representatives and Senate first organize.
156. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 165.
157. Id. at 154.
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"reinvigorated majority rule,"'5 8 then proponents of populist
constitutional law must abolish all institutions, not just judicial
review, that privilege the status quo in any way. Constitutional law
will be returned to the people in this populist sense only if Americans make far more extensive use of the referenda and adopt a more
parliamentary form of government.' 59 Unless these reforms are
adopted, taking the power of judicial review from the courts will
neither take the Constitution entirely away from the courts nor
ensure that democratic majorities control constitutional decisionmaking.
The judicial power to "interpret" statutes consistently with the
thin Constitution is problematic even if the present constitutional
procedures for making laws satisfy populist standards. Any
populism that rejects simple majority rule will find that on some
issues some of the time, no lawmaking majority exists for any
position. 6 ° Some rule or process must be in place to resolve potential
legislative deadlocks. A populist process of constitutional decisionmaking would not rely on institutions resembling federal courts to
determine law when no majority for any position existed in those
governing institutions vested with the ultimate authority for
making public policy and interpreting the thin Constitution.
Members of a populist institution authorized to make decisions in
the absence of lawmaking majorities would be elected, serve fixed
terms, and probably be ineligible for reelection after holding office
for a certain period of years. Populist democracy frowns on life
terms for any public official, not just those officials entrusted with
the power to declare laws unconstitutional.
The populist institution responsible for breaking deadlocks would
be less subject to elite penetration than the present federal judiciary. The thin Constitution in the courts is not likely to receive a
working-class interpretation. Those persons who have access to elite
legal resources have more success litigating than those who do

158. PARKER, supranote 3, at 104. Professor Tushnet does not make clear the relationship
between populist democracy, majoritarian democracy, and consensual democracy. For possible
implications for judicial power, see infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
159. Professor Tushnet has elsewhere expressed some sympathy for these reforms. See
MARK TUSHNET, The Whole Thing, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES/CONSTITUTONAL
TRAGEDIES 104 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
160. This problem may also occur with simple majority rule when more than two
alternatives exist. Seegenerally KENNETHJ. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICEAND INDrvIDUALVALUES
(2d ed. 1963) (discussing economic theory).
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not.' 6 ' Judicial decision-makers almost exclusively represent the
upper class. 6 2 Elite educational institutions perpetuate this
inequality by educating and credentialing the vast majority of
persons who will become elite attorneys and the vast majority of
persons who will become elite justices.'6 3 These elites are likely to
determine how the thin Constitution in the courts is interpreted,
even if 4courts renounce the power to declare laws unconstitu16
tional.
These arguments hardly constitute a definitive populist case
against granting courts any constitutional power. Litigation may
better foster political participation than populists have historically
recognized.' 65 The liberal or populist benefits from Justices interpreting statutes consistently with the thin Constitution may
outweigh the slight populist costs of a less-participatory form of
constitutional decision-making. These arguments, however, cannot
easily be cabined to statutory interpretation. If courts are prone to
make liberal/populist rulings when given the power to interpret
statutes in light of the thin Constitution, then courts should be
prone to make liberal/populist rules when given the power to declare
statutes unconstitutional in light of the thin Constitution. Judicial
review, in these circumstances, favors the political Left and is not,
as Professor Tushnet proclaims, "noise around zero."'66 Similarly, if
granting Justices the power to interpret statutes in light of the thin
Constitution increases popular participation in constitutional
decision-making, then granting Justices the power to declare laws
unconstitutional in light of the thin Constitution may further
increase political participation. These questions cannot be resolved
by definitional fiat. Just as actual practice is the best guide for
determining whether judicial powers are likely to be used in ways
that benefit the Left, so actual practice is the best guide for

161. See SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 151-59 (1990); see also GRABER, supranote 25, at 121-22.

See generally Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
ofLegal Change, 9 LAw & Soc. REV. 95 (1974).
162. See HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS:AHISTORYOFTHEU.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 44-45 (new rev. ed. 1999).

163. See id. at 45.
164. One may wonder whether a working-class populist in a trdatise on populist
constitutional law would have focused exclusively on judicial reform, leaving untouched such
institutions as Cravath, Swaine & Moore and the Yale Law School.
165. See infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
166. TUSHNET,supranote 3, at 153.
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determining whether different judicial powers increase popular
participation in the making of constitutional law.
2. Judicial Review and Participation Reconsidered
Many proponents ofjudicial power tend to compare courts at their
best to legislatures at their worst. 6 7 Judicial review looks pretty
good to liberals when the choice is between Earl Warren and Joe
McCarthy. That practice seems less attractive when the alternatives
are Clarence Thomas and Barbara Jordan. 6 ' Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts properly calls on scholars to kick this bad
habit. Professor Tushnet recognizes that judicial review "cannot be
defended except by seeing how it operates-whether in fact the
government is better with it than without it."'6 9 This assessment
requires careful examination of how the Justices have generally
performed in routine cases and their historical willingness to
intervene in clear cases of legislative tyranny. On the basis of such
a review, Professor Tushnet argues with much plausibility that
judicial review may not be the best means for protecting constitutional liberties. 7 °
Professor Tushnet abandons this critical realism when he
considers what decision-making process will best enable "the public
[to] ... participate in shaping constitutional law more directly and
openly."' 7' Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts never
examines actual legislative or judicial processes to determine the
extent to which each presently promotes the participation valued by
populists. The argument seems to be simply that legislative
processes are more populist than judicial processes because
legislators are elected and federal judges are not. That many adults
do not vote, that most vote only in presidential elections, that the
candidates in those elections spend more time appealing for large
donations than votes, and that political scientists speak of the
"declining significance of elections"7 2 has no role in this analysis.
167. See id. at 56.
168. Conservatives should reverse the order of these names or substitute new, more
appropriate names.
169. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 152.
170. See id. at 129-53 (chapter entitled "Assessing Judicial Review").
171. Id. at 194.
172. BENJAMIN GINSBERG& MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BYOTBERMEANs: THE DECLINING
IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 9 (1990). Ginsberg and Shefter identify 'judicial
proceedings" as one cause of the declining significance of elections, but they are as concerned
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This failure to compare present legislative and judicial processes
may be rooted in Professor Tushnet's misleading claim that
"[p]opulist constitutional law returns constitutional law to the
people, acting through politics."'73 This assertion implies a limited
conception of politics that Professor Tushnet then recognizes
mistakenly separates law from politics. Immediately after implying
that law is not politics, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the
Courts criticizes the conventional claim that "we have a principled
Constitution, where courts rule, and unprincipled politics, where the
mere preferences of democratic majorities rule." 74 Professor
Tushnet further acknowledges that "courts everywhere are parts of
the national political system."'7 5 Citizens, such observations should
have led him to state explicitly, engage in politics when they support
litigation campaigns aimed at persuading Justices to declare laws
unconstitutional or vote for a President they believe will appoint
Justices committed to overruling Roe v. Wade.'7 6 A constitutional
regime committed to judicial supremacy determines constitutional
meanings through politics, even if those politics are different from
the constitutional politics in a regime committed to a -different
constitutional decision-making process.
Constitutional meanings are always determined by political
processes, even in an absolute monarchy where the political process
consists entirely of efforts to convince the king that some policy is
desirable. Asking whether constitutional meaning shall be determined by a political process, therefore, does not advance constitutional theory. The populist question is what political processes are
most likely to enable the people to "participate in shaping constitutional law more directly and openly."' Many reasons exist for
thinking that a judicial process would be part of the broader
political process that at present best promotes participatory values.
Judicial review may "enhance the public's consideration of
fundamental issues"'7 8 by increasing public awareness of certain
fundamental issues. Judicial decisions have publicized and nationalized political controversies. The Supreme Court's opinions declaring

with criminal prosecutions against government officials as the judicial power to declare laws
unconstitutional. See id. at x, 19.
173. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 186.
174. Id. at 187.
175. Id. at 134.
176. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

177. TUSH=T, supra note 3, at 194.
178. Id. at 106.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:373

flag-burning unconstitutional stimulated a movement to make that
practice illegal. Likewise, Roe v. Wade dramatically increased
popular interest in the abortion issue.'79 Little evidence supports
claims that federal judges serve as republican schoolmasters,
educating people about fundamental constitutional values. 80
Judicial decisions on abortion tended to harden existing opinions,
" ' Still, many activists on both sides of the
rather than refine them.18
abortion issue probably would not have participated in politics had
reproductive policy not been nationalized by judicial decision.'82
Judicial review may facilitate public participation in constitutional decision-making because litigation is a form of political
participation. "[Plarticipation in the legal process," Professor Susan
Lawrence notes, "can fulfill the functions given to participation in
classical democratic theory: develop responsible, individual, social
and political action; increase feelings among individuals that they
belong to the community; and ensure that all are equally makers
and subjects of law."18 Moreover, litigation is a particularly cheap
form of political participation. Groups that cannot afford increasingly expensive lobbying and electoral campaigns are nevertheless
guaranteed their day in court if members claim that their constitutional rights have been violated. "A few volunteer lawyers, several
wealthy benefactors, and support from relatively small organizations provided the resources necessary for placing abortion in the
agenda of the federal judiciary." 8 ' Terri Peretti has similarly
concluded that constitutional litigation serves to expand political
participation in the United States. "[T]he opportunities for groups
to gain access to and [have] an effective voice in government
policymaking are greatly expanded," she writes, when courts have
the power to declare laws unconstitutional. 8
Judicial review may "distribut [e] responsibility for constitutional
law [more] broadly" than legislative processes when flaws in
electoral processes inhibit greater and equal political participa-

179. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 137-44 (1984)
(discussing the immediate effects of Roe v. Wade).
180. See id.
181. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, The Republican Schoolmaster: The
Supreme Court,Public Opinion and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 751, 768 (1989).
182. See id.
183. LAWRENCE, supra note 161, at 154.
184. GRABER, supra note 25, at 122.
185. TERRI JENNINGS PERETTi, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 219 (1999).
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tion.18 6 Contemporary populists are particularly incensed by the
influence of money in American politics. "Who can look at the
system by which national elections are financed," Sandy Levinson
declares,
and describe it as anything other than corrupt, and increasingly
threatening the basic integrity of the American political system? And
who can take seriously the capacity of Trent Lott, Tom DeLay, or
President Clinton, each of them mired in this corrupt process, to offer
genuinely disinterested advice on what we as citizens might do to
reclaim our political system from the tentacles of big money?18

In this political regime, the average citizen may have more opportunity to make an argument that will influence a federal judge than
to make a cash contribution that will influence an elected official.
Judicial review may increase popular influence in democratic
decision-making to the extent that "political decision making is in
reality almost always more a matter of elite bargaining than
popular deliberation."' 8 Prominent political sociologists maintain
that people "cannot have large institutions such as nation states,
trade unions, political parties, or churches, without turning over
effective power to the few who are at the summit of these institu8 9 If these theories of democracy are descriptively accurate,
tions.""
taking the Constitution away from the courts will merely change the
balance of power among those elites who determine constitutional
meaning. Populist interests may not be served by taking power from
judicial elites. Working-class concerns may best be promoted when
conflict among elites is maximized. The more homogenous the elite
in power, the fewer the conflicts that will require elites to seek
popular support. The intellectual and cultural elites who exercise
judicial power may also be more sympathetic to populist concerns
than the business elites more likely to influence legislatures. At the
very least, the progressive elites who tend to occupy appointed
positions may provide some counterbalance to the market forces
that have historically undermined populist institutions.

186. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at x.
187. Levinson, supra note 5, at 216.
188. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 36 (1997).
189. Seymour Martin Lipset, Introduction to ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 15 (Eden

Paul & Cedar Paul trans., 1962).
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Judicial review may increase public control over constitutional
meanings when elected officials have not and will not resolve those
controversies presently resolved by courts. Many commentators
think "delegation by majoritarian institutions" is the most important cause ofjudicial review. 9 ' "Political leaders," Professor Tushnet
agrees, "often find judicial review a convenient way to hand off hard
decisions to someone else." 9 ' Legislative deference to the judiciary
is not, however, always best understood as a practice that "may
serve politicians' interests, not their constituents'."'9 2 Promoting
judicial review on some issues is one way politicians are able to take
clear stands on issues of more importance to more people. Political
struggles are not simply fought over particular issues, but over what
issues will be fought about. As E.E. Schattschneider recognized,
"[s]ome issues are organized into politics while others are organized
out."'9 3 Jacksonian politicians during the 1840s and 1850s took very
clear stands on the national bank and sought to depoliticize slavery.
The coalition that arose to fight slavery deliberately avoided taking
stands on the issues associated with the national bank. 9 4 The
Populist Party similarly refused to take a stand on temperance in
order to be able to take a more clear stand on currency issues."'
Unless there is a radical change in the political system's capacity to
absorb numerous cross-cutting issues, taking the Constitution away
from the courts will not force elected officials to make more policy
decisions. The more likely consequence is that elected officials will
continue ignoring issues previously decided by courts, foist those
issues off on some other institution whose members are not directly
accountable to voters, or pay much less attention to other issues
that had previously been on the legislative agenda.
Judicial review may be part of populist democracy at present
because any campaign to abolish that practice would detract from
more important populist priorities. Were Professor Tushnet to run
for office on an anti-judicial review platform, he would have to

190. C. Neal Tate, Why the Expansion of JudicialPower? in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 27,32 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995). See generally Graber,
The NonmajoritarianProblem,supra note 43, at 35.
191. TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 173.
192. Id.
193. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALISTS VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 69 (1975):
194. See Graber, The NonmajoritarianProblem,supra note 43, at 39-40, 46-47.
195. See KAZIN, supra note 27, at 37-38.
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disavow his previous commitment to democratic socialism.'96
Otherwise he would lose support from liberals committed to judicial
review and anti-court conservatives opposed to the welfare state.
Populists have historically been unwilling to mute economic
concerns to achieve such institutional reforms. William Jennings
Bryan consciously decided not to push for an elective judiciary when
doing so might reduce support for other populist concerns.'9 7
Judicial review may promote populist lawmaking by enabling
lawmaking majorities to pass important legislation. American
legislators have frequently secured the passage of needed reforms
by including a provision in the final bill facilitating a second, judicial
look at particularly controversial proposals. The Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1974198 and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 99
were enacted only when legislators opposed to several provisions in
each bill were induced to vote for passage by the addition of clauses
ensuring that federal courts would immediately have the opporunity to delete offending sections of both measures.2 °° American
politics for this reason do not support Professor Tushnet's assertion
that "[t]he Court's campaign finance decisions" effectively "block us
20 1
from taking steps to reduce the influence of economics on politics."
Judicial review facilitated campaign finance reform during the
1970s by permitting legislators to support what they believed was
a less-than-perfect bill in the hope that the Court might perfect the
measure. Without judicial review, Congress might not have passed
those campaign finance reforms held constitutional in Buckley v.
Valeo. °2
Judicial review may be an element of populist democracy if that
practice is inextricably connected to other institutions that populists
value. Studies of the United States and other countries indicate that
judicial review flourishes under certain conditions. °3 Scholars have

196. See Mark Tushnet, The DilemmasofLiberal Constitutionalism,42 0HIO ST. L.J. 411,
424(1981).
197. See Ross, supra note 19, at 36.
198. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 201 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
199. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-909, 921-922(1994).
200. See FISHER, supra note 15, at 36; see also BARBARA HHMON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE
STORY OF AN Epic CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 70 (1988).

201. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 131.
202. 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976). Tushnet is right to point to "the judicial overhang [that]
distorts what legislators say about the Constitution." TUSHNET, supranote 3, at 57. Still, the
example oflaws passed only after proponents agree to expedite judicial review is an example
of how judicial review may foster some participatory virtues while inhibiting others.
203. See Tate, supranote 190.
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identified several factors, including the separation of powers, a
politics of rights, interest group politics, weak parties, and federalism, as facilitating, though not necessarily compelling, the
judicialization of politics in liberal democracies." 4 This association
is practical, not logical. Professor Tushnet properly notes that a
polity can have a politics of rights without judicial review; 20 5
constitutional rights claims may be even more effective when
directed at elected officials than at unelected justices. 20 6 Still,
history suggests that certain institutional forms and practices
reinforce each other. A populist unwilling to challenge federalism,
the separation of powers, weak parties, and a politics of rights is not
likely to mount a successful challenge to judicial review.
Judicial review may be a populist practice if populists are more
committed to consensual rather than majoritarian democracy.
Consensual democracies, Arend Lijphart notes, are not "satisfied
with narrow decision-making majorities." 2 7 That democratic
practice "seeks to maximize the size of those majorities" by designing "rules and institutions [that] aim at broad participation in
government and broad agreement on the policies that the government should pursue."20 ' Granting judicial power to interpret a hardto-amend constitution is one of the important practices adopted by
virtually all consensus democracies. "In the pure consensus model,"
Lijphart writes, "the Constitution is rigid and protected by judicial
review."2 09 The American experience may support this view of courts
as a more consensual institution, or at least an institution that
makes the political system more consensual as a whole. Terri
Peretti believes that as a result of judicial review, "the political
system" in the United States "possess[es] a greater capacity to
discover, with more certainty and reliability, the stable and
enduring bases of political consensus."21 ° Significantly, Lijphart's
study found that consensual institutions may perform better than

204. See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRAcY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIR Y-Six COUNTRIEs 3-4 (1999); Tate, supranote 190, at 28-33. Liberal
democracy is another practice precondition for judicial review. See id. at 28. Justices in
dictatorships do not declare laws unconstitutional. No opponent ofjudicial review, however,
maintains the absence ofludicial review to be a virtue of Stalinist Russia or present day Iraq.
205. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 163-64.
206. See id. at 166.
207. LIJPHART, supra note 204, at 2.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 216.
210. PERETTI, supra note 185, at 219.
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majoritarian institutions on a variety of dimensions.2 1 ' If "citizens
in consensus democracies are significantly more satisfied with
democratic performance in their countries than citizens of
majoritarian democracies," 12 and if populist democrats ought to
prefer institutions that increase popular satisfaction with democratic performance, then populist democrats might support judicial
review as one element of consensual democracy.
Judicial review may be a populist practice if judicial decisions
declaring laws unconstitutional are at least as consistent with
public opinion as the political decisions made by other governing
officials. Some Supreme Court decisions, most notably the decisions
declaring unconstitutional state-sponsored prayer in public
schools, 1 clearly lacked popular support. The electoral branches of
government, however, are equally capable of acting in this
countermajoritarian fashion. Witness the congressional decision to
impeach President Clinton" 4 and President Clinton's decision to
veto a bill banning partial-birth abortions. 1 ' The comparative
performance of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
the national government has led scholars to conclude that "the
modern Court appears neither markedly more nor less consistent
with the polls than are other policy makers."2 6 The mechanisms by
which public opinion influences judicial decisions may be different
than the mechanisms by which public opinion influences other
officials. Still, whether because of factors identified in the above
paragraphs or for some other reason, the people may presently
exercise the same control over the Constitution in the courts as they
do outside of the courts.
These claims hardly refute populist or other attacks on judicial
review. Much of the empirical evidence is controversial or represents
at most preliminary findings. Gregory Caldeira's comment that "we
do not yet have sufficient evidence on which we can place much
confidence" concerning whether "the Supreme Court represent[s]

211. See LIJPHART, supranote 204, at 7-8.
212. Id. at 286.
213. See, e.g., Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962).
214. H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998).
215. See President's Message to the House ofRepresentatives Returningwithout Approval
Partial Birth Abortion Legislation, PUB. PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. CLMON 1340 (1997).
216. THOMAS MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINIONAND THE SUPREME COURT 80 (1989). For a good
summary of existing studies on public support for particular judicial decisions, see GREGORY
A. CALDEIRA, Courtsand Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICALASSESSMENT
303, 313-16 (John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
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public opinion" could be said ofthe judicial role promoting consensus
and participation.2 17 Moreover, the weight of this evidence depends
on populist commitments. A populism committed to increasing
public participation and consensus democracy might find that
judicial review facilitates that goal. A populism committed to more
equal political influence and majoritarian democracy might prefer
legislative supremacy. These opinions would also depend on
estimates concerning elite influences on legislative politics, and
whether those elites who exercise judicial power may have more
populist sympathies than those elites who exercise legislative
power. For all these reasons, the claims in this section are presented
in the Tushnetian spirit, as designed only to "open[ ] up issues that
thoughtful voters and elected officials should think about, and that
are obscured by the elitist constitutional law that dominates
contemporary legal thought."2 1
The claims above do demonstrate, however, why a populism that
focuses exclusively on taking the Constitution away from the courts
is a thin populism, even when that populism is limited to populist
constitutional law. Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts
properly highlights nonjudicial institutions as appropriate fora for
constitutional decision-making. Entrusting legislatures with final
or shared authority for making constitutional decisions means that
the populist flaws in those electoral institutions must be cured in
order to realize populist constitutional law. Should these flaws not
be corrected, giving the judiciary shared or final authority may be
the most populist alternative. Expanding the current legal services
program may be a more populist reform than abandoning judicial
9
review.

21

III. FROM POPULISM TO PROGRESSIVISM
Liberal legal elites face particular difficulties articulating populist
values. Liberal economists who wear the populist label recognize
that working-class citizens are more likely to favor loose money
policies than those elites who hold prestigious chairs in business
schools and economic departments, run major banks, or sit on the

217. Caldeira, supranote 216, at 316.
218. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at x.
219. Judicial review would also meet more populist standards if Justices were elected to
fixed terms. The possibility of that reform seems even less likely than serious campaign
finance reform.
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Federal Reserve Board.22 ° Conservative legal elites who speak as
populists better articulate the values of ordinary people on many
cultural issues than their peers in the academy, at the bar, or on the
bench. 22 ' Liberal legal elites who profess populism, however, are
rarely able to excoriate fellow elites for being out of touch with the
mainstream on those issues presently being considered by the
Supreme Court. On the constitutional questions that have most
excited the general public, questions ranging from abortion to the
role of religion in public life, the academic legal left is far more
likely to find allies among secular elites of all political persuasions
than among the more religious working-class.222
Recasting populism is one solution to this liberal dilemma. Taking
the ConstitutionAway from the Courts redefines as populist only
those participatory values that have historically animated mass
movements. Populist constitutional law, in legal populist writing, is
indifferent to the religious, economic, and cultural values on which
liberal law professors and working-class citizens are likely to
disagree. This rhetorical strategy is legitimate. No obligation exists
for any movement seeking the populist mantle to adopt some fixed
percentage of the demands made in the Omaha Platform or to bear
a very close relationship to some other political movement generally
recognized as populist. That populism has historically combined
producerism and participatory rhetoric hardly means that a
coherent constitutional theory cannot be fashioned exclusively from
participatory strands of populism. Moreover, populism has evolved
throughout American history. The label is neither trademarked nor
copyrighted. The legal populist's call for participation by all people,
not just white, male Christian people, does have affinities with labor
populism of the 1930s and communitarian populism of the 1980s.223
Whether Professor Tushnet and others are eventually seen to be the

220. See, e.g., James K. Galbraith, How the Economists GotIt Wrong, AM. PROSPECT, Feb.
14, 2000, at 18.
221. See, e.g., William BradfordReynolds,RenewingtheAmericanConstitutionalHeritage,
8 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY 225, 234 (1985) (describing the political liberalism of lawyers,
judges, and law professors as "the liberalism of a verbal elite ... out of touch with the mass
of Americans").
222. Liberal law professors are more likely than other elites to prefer the redistributive

policies favored by most working-class citizens. Most liberal law professors, however, think
that the judiciary should not declare unconstitutional unjust economic policies. See Graber,
The ClintonificationofArerican Law, supra note 43, at 738-44. Professor Tushnet, to his
credit, does maintain that redistribution ought to be a goal of populist constitutional law. See
TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 183-86.
223. See KAZIN, supra note 27, at 135-63.
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intellectual descendants of those populists will depend more on who
rallies to their causes than on how intellectual historians classify
their ideas.
Liberal academics may nevertheless be better advised to discard
a populist label that no more describes their political vision than the
classical republicanism label describes the legal republicanism of
the past two decades. Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts
and allied commentary are far more similar in substance and spirit
to the writings of John Dewey and other left-wing progressives than
the works of Ignatius Donnelly and the populists of any generation.
Dewey, Brandeis, and others believed that public participation in
politics is a vital democratic good, but that more educated participation is better than less uneducated participation. 224 Participatory
democrats celebrate democracy not simply for giving ordinary
citizens a say in their governance, but as the political system most
likely to improve human capacity. 225 Rather than proclaim the
supremacy of one democratic value, the best strain of progressivism
strives to find means by which democracy will benefit from the
wisdom of ordinary people and from the trained capacities of
persons with particular expertise in governing.
Liberal law professors who identify with this grass-roots progressivism make sense of their lives, occupations, and ambitions.
Professors of political science and law seek to improve the capacity
of their students and the general public. The best professors may
enable their students to obtain more rewarding jobs and live more
satisfactory lives, but the primary function of progressive public
education is to produce better citizens. The primary function of elite
education, in this vein, is to produce better political leaders. No
progressive thinks amending the Constitution to require a certain
SAT score for public office is a good idea. Elite education is better
understood as a privilege that entails a responsibility to serve the
public, service that requires respect rather than obeisance to public
opinion. Professor Tushnet implicitly endorses the progressive
conception of leadership when, recognizing that most people favor
judicial review, he hopes for a statesmanship that will convince the

224. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916).
225. See, e.g., Davis, supranote 115, at 37 (arguing that contemporary"realist" democratic
theory fails to provide moral guidance for future action).
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populace otherwise. 226 The more traditional populist leader merely
articulates more eloquently what the people already believe.227
Scholars who acknowledge that governance by more educated
persons is likely to be better than governance by less-educated
persons need not forget that progressive movements succeed only
when political leaders are able to appeal to the beliefs and aspirations of the great majority that did not go to Ivy League colleges or
elite law schools. "No major problem can be seriously addressed,"
Michael Kazin properly concludes, "unless what an antebellum
populist called the 'productive and burden-bearing classes-Americans of all races who work hard for a living, knit neighborhoods together, and cherish what the nation is supposed to stand
for-participate in the task."228 The assertion, "I should govern
because I am well educated," may contain philosophical truth, but
is a sure political loser. Fashioning a broadly persuasive liberal
rhetoric is a vital job. That responsibility, however, primarily falls
on politicians. Professors are responsible for educating persons of all
political persuasions. Our fundamental role as scholars is to
increase the number of ideas available to our fellow citizens.2 29
Judged by this standard, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the
Courts is a work of philosophical genius.
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